1. Strengthening the Party and the Left forces is also required to lead the fight against the Hindutva communal agenda and the activities of communal forces. The Party must work for the broadest mobilisation of all secular forces against Hindutva communalism.”
2. “This requires a set of alternative pro-people policies that must be implemented. The assaults on our Constitutional order and the secular, democratic character of our republic have been mounted by the RSS/BJP using its control of the government and the State apparatus.
“The defence of our Constitutional order and democracy can only be achieved by ensuring that the BJP is separated from controlling government and State power. Likewise, any alternate set of pro-people policies can only be implemented when the BJP is removed from controlling the government apparatus.
“Hence, to safeguard the Constitutional republic, to further strengthen it and to change the policy direction towards a radical people oriented one, it is imperative that the BJP and its allies are defeated in the forthcoming elections to the 18 th Lok Sabha.”
“CPI(M) Appeals to the Indian Electorate to:
1. Defeat the BJP and its allies.
2. Increase the strength of the CPI(M) and the Left parties in the Lok Sabha.
3. Ensure that an alternative secular government is formed at the Centre.”
4. The main political factor for the victory of the UDF and the defeat of the LDF is that for a considerable section of the people, particularly the minorities, the aim of defeating the BJP at the Centre was seen as feasible only by the Congress, which is leading the INDIA bloc. The Left was not seen by them as a major player in the defeat of the BJP and the formation of an alternative government. This was the same trend witnessed in the 2019 election when Rahul Gandhi contested from the Wayanad constituency. This trend continued with Muslims and a section of secular voters rallying behind the UDF. This overcame the strong campaign by the LDF that they are the most consistent fighters against the BJP and its majority communalism.
5. A disturbing feature of the election results is the erosion of our traditional base in several constituencies to the BJP. While the main reason for the success of the BJP in Thrissur is the vote it got from the Congress base and a section of the Christians, it is a fact that some of our voting base has gone to the BJP in several places. This is particularly so in constituencies like Attingal and Alappuzha. In the former, we lost narrowly by 684 votes and in the latter, the BJP has come close to our vote share. “Hindu sentiments” and caste influence have affected our vote base to some extent in other seats also.
The BJP-RSS work to advance Hindutva politics has shown results. They have been using temples, religious and social activities as a means to propagate their Hindutva and anti-minority politics. They have been using various Central schemes which convey benefits to penetrate selected caste groups. Self-critically it must be noted that we have not paid sufficient attention to counter their politics and activities. This must be taken up on a priority basis.
Caste and communal organisations played a heightened role in this election. The SNDP (Ezhava organisation) leadership has worked in favour of the BJP by and large. The Jamaat-e-Islami and the SDPI – two extremist organisations – have combined with the Muslim League and campaigned vigorously against the LDF and in favour of the Congress.
The politics and ideology of extremist groups like the SDPI and Jamaat-e-Islami and the Muslim League’s collaboration with these elements must be exposed and countered. Our approach to the Muslim minority is based on secular democratic principles which must be taken to the people directly. The false charge of Muslim appeasement must be rebuffed. The Party should also work out appropriate steps to expose and counter the dubious role of the SNDP leadership.
A section of the Christian church establishment has tilted in favour of the BJP. The BJP has utilized the growing anti-Muslim sentiments within the church and also adopted a carrot and stick policy to woo church leaders. The support extended to the BJP candidate in Thrissur is an illustration.
6. The estimates of the votes we can get at the pre-poll stage and after polling in each constituency show a wide gap with the actual results. This shows that the Party units are unable to gauge the mood of the people and their preferences. The weakening of the Party’s live links with people has to be corrected.
7. Instances of arrogant behaviour of cadres – from top to bottom – are alienating people from the Party. The importance of rectification to eliminate wrong trends and behaviour must be undertaken in a planned manner.
The Party has to evolve steps to counter the ideological and political influence of the Hindutva forces. It must continue to expose the opportunist stand of the Congress in Kerala, which acts as an opposition to the LDF in concert with the BJP. The state government has announced that it will prioritise delivery of social welfare pensions and other benefits to the working people without interruption.
8. The Party and the Left Front campaigned for the defeat of the BJP whose ten-year rule at the Centre had posed a serious threat to the secular democratic character of the Indian State, through the institution of an authoritarian and communal- corporate nexus. At the same time, the Party called for the defeat of the TMC, whose government was ruling the state for the past thirteen years, had instituted a corrupt, criminal nexus, and governed by suppressing the opposition and assaulting the democratic rights of citizens.
9. Both TMC and BJP were interested in such a bipolar situation existing, which would marginalize the CPI(M) and the Left. This led to secular voters, particularly the minorities, gravitating to the TMC.
10. per cent. It is, therefore, important to underline the necessity to improve and expand our political-ideological campaign against the BJP and the Hindutva forces.
11. While calling for the defeat of the BJP and TMC, it seems in actual campaigning, the focus of fighting the BJP, especially as this was a Parliament election, was less and more emphasis in the campaign was against the TMC at the lower levels. This problem is persisting from the last Assembly elections and steps should be taken to educate the cadres about the thrust of the political line of the Party.
12. The state committee review notes that there were no polling agents in 12 to 14 per cent of booths. This points to the weak state of Party organisation. There are many areas where there has been no Party in existence for a long time.
13. The joint campaign led by DMK was conducted strongly and effectively against the BJP and the Modi government, which helped rally public opinion against the BJP.
14. We have to creatively propagate how the interests of Tamilnadu, its tradition of social reforms, cultural identity and state’s rights are in danger due to the BJP and the policies of the Modi government.
The Party daily Theekkathir played an effective role in helping the Party’s election campaign in the two constituencies where our candidates fought. The social media teams also did good work in the two constituencies.
15. The main reason for this lopsided verdict is the widespread election malpractices and casting of false votes.
16. The Party was handicapped in our election work due to the disarray in the state of Party organisation at the lower levels. Though direct physical attacks have considerably reduced, various forms of intimidation of Party members and supporters by threatening their livelihood and safety have led to a situation where large number of Party members and primary units have become inactive.
17. This victory was made possible because of the full support and cooperation of the Congress leadership and its MLAs and workers of the party. The image of Amra Ram as a militant kisan leader and a four-time legislator also contributed to getting wider support. Our candidate got support from the various peasant communities, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and total support of the Muslim minorities.
18. The failure of the Mahagathbandhan to succeed in north Bihar has impacted our performance in Khagaria, apart from our own weaknesses.
19. There are reports that in some places where we were not in the contest, some of the Party’s mandal committee members, unit secretaries and Party members worked in violation of the Party line. Corrective steps should be taken in this matter.
20. We contested the Bhubaneswar parliamentary seat and secured 4,148 votes (0.38 per cent). We should have struck to the earlier understanding of the state secretariat not to contest the seat.
21. But the developments of struggles at the local levels on class and mass issues have not made much progress. Struggles on a sustained basis, which leads to some success in winning partial demands, have occurred only in some places and not become a widespread phenomenon.
22. the resurgence of identity politics and the resort to such politics to weaken the CPI(M) and the Left.
the resurgence of tribal identity politics has contributed to the erosion of the strong tribal base of the Communist movement.
Generally speaking, identity politics based on caste, community and religion has contributed to further eroding the Party’s independent strength in other states too.
23. We have to find ways to counter such identity politics based on our class-based politics and combine it with our taking up social issues which concern the socially oppressed sections.
24. The weakness in the politicization of the people who participate in our struggles needs to be urgently rectified. Party leaders and cadres must seek to overcome the weaknesses in internalizing our political-organizational orientation. This is urgently required to bridge the mismatch between people’s participation in struggles and their voting preferences at the time of elections.
25. There is also the more general question of the failure of Party units and Party members maintaining live relations with the people.
26. The Party should continue to be part of the wider unity to defend the Constitution, democracy, secularism and federalism. We should work for the widest mobilization of all democratic and secular forces.
27. The election result indicates that the Hindutva bloc of votes is more or less intact. This requires the taking up of the ideological–political struggles against the BJP-RSS and Hindutva forces in all spheres in concrete form.
28. Party building and political work in specific sections and areas to be concretely worked out.
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